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Abstract 
 
 
This paper theorises how decision-makers in the EU legislative process reach 
consensual decisions and in which policy direction through a mechanism of “implicit 
voting”. I introduce spatial model coalitional bargaining using a utility function that 
incorporates decision-maker considerations of the policy gains they expect to obtain for 
an outcome and the policy concessions they will need to give to other decision-makers 
so as to have this outcome accepted. The model predicts the formation of a compact 
coalition where the differences among the distances between each decision-maker 
position and the coalitional position are less pronounced than in competing alternative 
coalitions. This coalition will be able to implement this policy position as the outcome 
of the legislative process. The empirical evaluation of the model with DEU for 44 
proposals and 111 issues of EU legislative process shows that the compact coalition 
offers a good prediction of how consensus in arrived at in the EU, suggesting that 
implicit voting explains well how EU decisional actor make decisions and the direction 
that this consensus takes. 
 
 
 
 
  
Introduction 
 
 
In the legislative process of the European Union, member governments and 
supranational institutions regularly negotiate the passage of new legislation involving 
policy change. Inductive accounts of the legislative process show that decision makers 
of the EU commonly take decisions through “implicit voting” (Hayes-Renshaw et al., 
2006; Golub, 1999; 2007; Novak, 2010). Implicit voting refers to the mechanism by 
which decision makers participating in the process estimate the existence of an effective 
qualified majority coalition in negotiations preceding the final agreement, so that an 
actual vote may not take place and decisions are officially adopted “by consensus”. The 
testimony of Dutch national representative Leendert Bal is illustrative in this regard:  
 
If an observer were to attend Council Meetings he or she would notice next to no 
evidence of a qualified-majority voting. It is unusual for presidencies to ask delegations 
to vote. The official explanation is that presidencies will seek consensus around the table 
and will thus avoid isolating colleagues. The expression of noblesse oblige is, of course, 
very welcome but it is only part of the explanation. Qualified-majority voting is like the 
sword of Damocles hanging above the negotiation table. It is in the mind of everyone. 
The Presidency, the Commission and delegations assess the state of the negotiation – 
almost permanently and automatically – in terms of whether there is a qualified majority 
or a blocking minority (Bal, 2004: 129).  
 In spite of the attested occurrence of implicit voting in the EU, there is very little 
research on how the mechanism operates (Naurin and Wallace, 2008: 5). Theoretical 
models dealing with negotiations in the EU have commonly focused on unanimous 
consent (Thompson et al., 2006; Schneider et al., 2010), leaving open the question of 
whether the “shadow of the vote” has any influence on the consensus building. This 
article delineates a new model of coalition formation explaining how decision makers 
reach legislative decisions under the implicit application of a qualified majority rule, 
and empirically evaluates the implications of the model across a large number of 
negotiations in the EU legislative process.  
The model is a spatial voting game in which coalitions of decision makers with 
spatial policy preferences simultaneously offer proposals for a policy compromise to a 
sufficient number of voters who will implicitly be necessary to complete the qualified 
majority that constitutes a winning coalition. The model crucially assumes that the 
decision maker incentives to choose a policy compromise strictly depend on the balance 
between the policy gains they obtain from the coalitional compromise and the policy 
concessions they need to give to other members of the coalition in order to see this 
compromise accepted. If a qualified majority coalition offers a compromise for which 
no decision maker inside the coalition has incentives to renege on in favour of another 
alternative, such a compromise will be selected as the final policy to be implemented as 
common legislation.  
Decision makers have three characteristics by which they can influence policy 
outcomes: their position in the policy space, their voting power, and the salience they 
attach to issues. The composition of a winning coalition and the content of its 
compromise proposal are then consequent upon a bargain reflecting the relative 
positions, power and salience of decision makers. According to the behavioural 
rationale stating that both considerations of policy gains and policy concessions 
intervene in the configuration of compromises, each decision maker payoff for 
accepting a coalitional compromise depends on a combination of these two components. 
A decision maker who is to make a compromise with other actors in a given coalition 
may consider the opportunity to switch to an alternative coalition offering a 
compromise closer to her ideal preference. However, if the concessions she has to make 
to the members of this second coalition outweigh the policy gains she obtains, in 
comparison to the previous coalition, the decision maker will not have incentives to 
switch and will accept the original compromise. The model predicts that decision 
makers will select the policy compromise offered by the more compact coalition: the 
winning coalition in which the differences among each of the decision makers‟ policy 
position and the coalitional compromise is less pronounced.  
Analytically, the formation of compact coalitions implies that legislative 
outcomes will have the imprint of the ideological choice preferred by a majority of 
decision makers. The empirical estimation of this implication relies on a comparison 
between the compact coalition model and a model of unanimous bargaining for  44 
proposals and 111 issues requiring qualified majority voting (QMV), obtained from 
Decision Making in the European Union (DEU) dataset (Thomson et al., 2006).   
 The article is organised as follows. In the first part, I discuss the literature on 
modelling EU decision making and the implications of implicit voting. Subsequently, 
the model is presented and a case of an EU legislative negotiation under co-decision is 
introduced to illustrate the reasoning of the model. The second part addresses the 
quantitative evaluation of the model. 
 
Modelling decision making in the cooperative environment of the EU   
  
Efforts to model how decisions in the EU are reached constitute now an extensive 
literature. The pioneering contributions on the subject conceived the decisional process 
as binary agenda non-cooperative games and focused on the effect that formal 
procedures have on decision-making outcomes (Tsebelis, 1994; Combrez, 2000; 
Tsebelis and Garrett, 2001; Steunenberg and Selck, 2006; Author Last Name, 2009). 
Procedural models introduce important insights in regard to inter-institutional dynamics 
and the general reform capacity of the EU. However, their non-cooperative 
assumptions, positing a strategic advantage of decision makers preferring the status quo, 
have proved ill-equipped to explain the tendency of EU decision makers to frequently 
reach consensual compromises (Achen, 2006b; König and Junge, 2009; Mattila and 
Lane, 2001; Selck, 2005). In this respect, cooperative models, allowing informal 
interactions among decision makers, offer a more plausible explanation of decision-
making outcomes in the cooperative environment of the EU, and have provided more 
accurate forecasts (Thomson et al., 2006). The vast majority of cooperative models 
applied to the EU are bargaining models which emphasize different factors influencing 
consensus building, such as issue logrolling (Arregui et al. 2006), domestic constraints 
(Bailer and Schneider, 2006), salience (Schneider et al. 2010) or interest 
accommodation (Achen, 2006a; Van den Bos, 1991). In bargaining models, the formal 
rule of qualified majority voting does not condition the behaviour of decision makers, 
so that decisions are taken by unanimity. Thus, the decision-making process appears as 
universally inclusive, representing the interests of all decision makers.  
Such a perspective crucially changes if the effect of the decision rule is 
integrated in informal negotiations. Implicit voting restricts the opportunities decision 
makers have under unanimity principles to stubbornly claim a major representation of 
their particular interests. Instead, decision makers have incentives to form a majority 
coalition with policy-minded legislators. As a consequence, implicit voting is likely to 
generate compromises that reflect a more ideological direction towards one side of the 
political spectrum than unanimous consent.  The informal process by which decision 
makers take a decision by applying majority voting procedures had been extensively 
studied by spatial models of coalition formation in the tradition of cooperative game 
theory (Bräuninger, 2007; Grofman, 1982; Mckelvey et al., 1978; Owen, 1995; 
Schofield, 1995, 2008; Sened, 1996). In context of the EU legislative process, however, 
there has been very little theoretical research on how the mechanism operates. To date, 
the coalition formation perspective has an isolated representative in the cooperative 
approach of Boekhoorn et al. (2006). Building on Axelrod‟s conflict of interest theory 
(Axelrod, 1970), this work assumes that players have incentives to form a winning 
coalition with minimal conflict. Upon this behavioural assumption for collective utility, 
their models predict stable outcomes implemented by coalitions that have less internal 
conflict.       
The coalition model introduced here differs from the work of Boekhoorn et al. in 
that it introduces a behavioral assumption directly on the individual utility of players, so 
that no player will to join a winning coalition if there is another winning coalition 
providing more individual policy rewards. The focus on the individual rationality 
provides solid microfoundations for explaining incentives of decision makers to 
cooperate in order to obtain majority policies closer to their own preference and posits a 
coalitional rationale distinct from the tendency of seeking “equitable” centripetal focal 
points (see Fiorina and Plott, 1978) or the willingness to avoid internal conflict within a 
coalition (Boekhoorn et al., 2006).  
 
The model  
 
Structure of the decision-making game 
We set up a committee simple voting game (see Machover and Felshental, 1998; 
Mckelvey et al., 1978; Owen, 1995) in order to characterize how decision makers take 
decisions under the implicit application of a majority rule. Let N be the set of players, 
who are decision makers attempting to influence the outcome of legislative 
negotiations.  Let C N  the coalitions that players can form, and v a mapping that 
assigns payoffs to each coalition. In the simple game, only the winning coalition, W, 
gathering at least a qualified majority of the weighed votes of the committee can assure 
the acceptance of a final policy proposal and impose it to the whole assembly of the 
players, so that 
3
4
W C N C , where C denotes the number of weighted votes 
in a coalition C. The final outcome takes the form in which the winning coalition is 
assigned the total value of the game (that is, the total payoffs of the game which its 
members are to divide among themselves), while losing coalitions get nothing, so that 
the solution of the game is defined by the characteristic function that specifies that 
 { ( ) 1}W C v C . The characteristic function thus states that any player can only 
secure a payoff from the game by being member of the winning coalition. Even if a 
player considers the status quo as a valuable outcome, the characteristic function tells us 
that the player can only secure this outcome if she obtains it through the formation of a 
winning coalition. Otherwise she will end up with no payoff, or equivalently, with a 
utility loss worse than the status quo, such as the damaging of institutional 
relationships
1
. Finally, we need to spell out that a simple game is proper if for every 
coalition C N, exactly one C, N C is winning. That is, only one contemporary subset 
of players may form a winning coalition, so that there can be no ties.  
We develop this scheme further by integrating empirically-oriented features of a 
legislative process. Suppose that conflict among decision-makers occurs over issue 
alternatives concerning how a policy is to be defined, as when they have to choose 
between adopting more or less stringent regulatory measures for environmental policy, 
or higher or lower harmonisation standards of safety in transport policy. We further note 
that most proposals submitted for legislation are multi-dimensional, so that decision-
makers are to decide simultaneously on two or more issues to adopt the final policy. In 
particular, let us adopt a spatial representation. Let {1,2,3 ... }M m be the set of all 
 
1
Specifically, let iu be the utility that any player can secure by acting alone, then i iu w for all i C and 
( )w v C  
 
issues represented in a m-dimensional Euclidean metric space mR . Let A be the real 
number segment describing the set of alternative outcomes the players confront among 
the larger set M, so that mA R is the convex hull representing the Pareto set of the 
game. Let any player have an ideal position or bliss point in the space, denoted as 
ix .  
I define the utility function of a player as incorporating the policy gains the 
player is to obtain from an outcome and the policy concessions that the player will need 
to give other players in order to get this outcome accepted. In evaluating alternative 
outcomes, any player will choose the outcome for which the combination of policy 
gains and policy concessions will offer her a greater utility. To capture this behavioural 
rationale, I thus define the preference of a player for an outcome as the sum of the 
player‟s Euclidean metric distance between the ideal position of the player and the 
policy outcome and the distance between each of the other players‟ position and the 
outcome, divided by the number of partners integrating the assembly or group in which 
the player participates. Formally, let U be a utility function representing the preference 
profile of all players on A. Then, for any actor i N  and any outcome A , there is a 
point 
m
ix R such that   
    
( )
jij N
i
j N
x x
U h                                                                            (1) 
 
  
where h is a decreasing function on the outcome and i j . The first term in the 
numerator of the main expression equals the “policy gains” that player i estimates from 
the policy outcome, these gains being larger the less the Euclidian distance of the ideal 
position of the player to the outcome. The second term in the numerator equals the 
“policy concessions” that each of the other players, j, will claim in exchange for 
implementing this outcome. The assumption that a player will be willing to give policy 
concessions follows naturally, in the context of a voting game, from the fact that only 
players who are represented in the winning coalition get any payoff from the game. If a 
player does not give other players sufficient concessions, the derived increase of 
disutility for these other players will make them choose a different partner, and a 
fortiori, a different outcome. Players who are distant from the policy outcome will be 
more “expensive” to the rest of the players and will need to give more concessions. It is 
important to note that each player having a different position in the policy space, the 
policy concessions they will claim will also differ. A player thus considers the gains and 
costs for every other player separately and then aggregates these quantities to define her 
total utility from the coalition. Note also that when two players have the same position, 
this will also be reflected in the outcome. As a consequence, players with the same 
position are treated here as a single player, so that no concessions among them are 
required. 
Finally, the division by the total number of partners in the group corrects for the 
effect that assemblies or groups of players with more members will automatically give 
less utility to the player, as the player will need to give more concessions, even if other 
players are close in the policy space.    
 
Coalitional bargaining: the compact coalition solution  
In the voting spatial game just defined, players have to select a policy outcome  over 
all possible alternatives that will be supported by a winning coalition. How is this policy 
outcome to be found? Following Mckelvey et al. (1978) conception of competition 
among coalitions, I represent the selection of an outcome as a process in which potential 
coalitions compete in offering proposals for a policy compromise to individual players 
so as to gain the sufficient support to form a winning coalition that will enforce the 
policy.   
In order to define these compromise proposals, we first need to know more 
about the players.  Following standard assumptions of cooperative bargaining models 
(Achen, 2006a; Arregui et al., 2006; Bueno de Mesquita and Stokman, 1994; Van den 
Bos, 1991), I define a player i as holding three characteristics by which the player can 
exert influence over the content of a policy, and these characteristics are common 
knowledge, so that decision making occurs under complete information. First, as 
already noted, a player has a policy position, 
ix , in  a m-dimensional policy space. 
Other things being equal, players can exert more influence in negotiations when their 
position is proximate to that of other players. Conversely, a player holding extreme 
preferences will be less influential. Secondly, a player holds a certain amount of voting 
power or capabilities, c, which makes the player more or less decisive in the adoption of 
a decision by the whole assembly.  Finally, a player attaches a certain degree of salience 
to issues. Salience captures how much the policy space means to the player, and hence 
determines how much effort the player is willing to spend on negotiations. In this view, 
salience represents an actualisation of decisiveness (see Bueno de Mesquita, 1994). 
Thus, a player can be described by a vector of three values, ( , ,i i ix c s ), always in a 
Euclidian space with metric properties.
2
      
When players form a coalition with other players, they will bargain the 
composition of the policy position that the coalition is to adopt as a collective entity. 
Given the characteristics of the players, the bargaining process will derive a policy 
position of the coalition, which is defined as the vector consisting of the weighed 
average of the positions of all players, where the weights are their voting power and 
saliency. The specific way in which the bargaining is conducted could, of course, be 
different. Any existing cooperative bargaining model could be used to obtain a policy 
 
2
 In the set of issues M = {1, 2, 3…m}, where m 1, a player‟s position on an issue, and the influence it 
can exert on the issue, may differ from that taken on another issue. Such variations will be reflected in the 
overall influence the player exerts on a given policy A . 
 
position of the coalition without modifying the logical consistency of the model. The 
weighted average of positions or “gravity centre” has, however, well-established 
support in the literature of coalition formation (see Boekhoorn et al., 2006; Grofman, 
1982; Schofield, 1995, 2008). The specification of a bargaining process for defining 
coalition positions implies that any coalition position will be a feasible outcome, A , 
and guarantees that the Pareto set A will be finite.  
 We can now define a compromise proposal as a policy position of a coalition 
which can gather the sufficient number of votes to be winning. More precisely:  
  
     of  is an ordered pair ( ; ) 
such that  ( ) (Mckelvey et al. 1978: 606).
A compromise proposal C N C
v C
Definition 1
                   
  
The question which arises is whether there is a compromise proposal that satisfies these 
conditions, so that it can be selected as the final policy. In principle, any policy point 
from the set of alternatives A that can be implemented by a winning coalition will be 
preferred by the players of this coalition and will constitute viable compromise 
proposal. As long as two players who are pivotal in winning coalitions have diverging 
preferences for the proposals of these coalitions, no policy will dominate the others and 
the social choice will be cyclical. It follows that a compromise proposal can be selected 
as a stable outcome only if it is undominated by any other policy, given the application 
of a decision rule. The set of undominated policies in the Pareto set A is known as the 
core.  
Traditional theories of coalition formation commonly face the prediction problem 
of an empty core with more than one policy dimension (Mckelvey, 1976; Owen, 1995). 
Under a supermajority rule, the existence of a core can be guaranteed for two 
dimensions (Schofield et al., 1988). However, the size of the core may still be extremely 
large in these situations. I will show, however, that the behavioural assumption 
introducing motivations of policy gains and concessions into the preference profile of 
players induces a strict reduction of undominated points with any voting rule and, under 
conditions of asymmetry of player positions and weights, allows us to find unique 
policy choice. I start presenting these results by first introducing a general definitions 
derived from Mckelvey et al. (1978: 606) stating that only the players that are in the 
intersection of coalitions,  “pivotal players”, are relevant for the choice of a policy 
compromise:  
  
  For any two policy compromise proposals ( ; ) and ( '; '),  
 ( ; ) is  by ( '; ') if it is the not case that  ( ') ( ) for all '.i
C C
C undominated C u u i C C
Definition 2
 
To see how this relation of dominance applies to the present model, we only need to 
compare the utility functions of players for the potential winning coalitions in a voting 
game. The player motivations for policy gains and policy concessions when joining a 
coalition reveal that undominated coalitions will be the coalitions in which the 
differences among each of the members‟ policy position and the coalitional compromise 
will be less pronounced than in any other coalitions. I will refer to these coalitions as 
compact coalitions3. The following result restates this finding:  
 
Proposition 1 For any two proposals ( ; )C and ( '; ')C , ( ; )C  is undominated by 
( '; ')C  if, given the preference profile U, it is not the case that 'C  is more compact 
than C,  for all 'i C C  (see proof in Appendix). 
 
  From this proposition it follows that the existence of a set of compact coalitions in a 
simple game guarantees stable outcomes. We now demonstrate that such a set always 
exists if a game is proper and finite.  
In a proper voting game, such as the one concerning the EU legislative process, 
the odd number of votes allocated to players assures that only a contemporary subset of 
winning coalitions will form. Moreover, when the number of players is finite, and each 
coalition makes only one proposal, the set of feasible outcomes will be finite. Under 
these two conditions, the formation of a unique set of winning coalitions more compact 
 
3
 The word “compact” is unrelated to and should not be confused with the notion of “compactness” and 
“compact set” which is used to refer to closed and bounded sets which contain an infinite number of 
choices.  
 
than any other coalition outside this set is assured. It is also clear that there will always 
be an ordering of compact coalitions, so that it is impossible that compact coalitions 
“mutually dominate” each other. Therefore, all points in the set will be undominated 
and the set will not be empty.   
 
Proposition 2 In any finite and proper spatial voting game, there is always a set of 
compromise proposals offered by compact coalitions which dominate any other point 
outside the set, and which are undominated by any other point in the set. Let 
com Adenote the set of compromise proposals offered by compact coalitions, then:  
    
'( ; ) for no ( '; ')  it is the case that ( ) ( ) for all ( ){ }com iC A C A u u i v C (2)
 com                                                                                                                        (3)                                                          
                                                                                                                                                                      
                                      
The expression (2) is a standard definition of the core. It differs only in the nonstandard 
definition of winning compromise proposals, as induced by the utility functions of 
players based on combined policy gains and concessions. The expression (3) simply 
restates that the compact-coalition core is not empty.  
The existence of a non-empty compact-coalition set constitutes the general 
solution of the game. As in other core related solutions, there is no insistence that the set 
com contains only one element (see Owen, 1995). Alternatives in the set may be only 
weakly preferred to other alternatives in the set by all the pivotal actors. Yet, the cases 
where we find several stable outcomes are special cases in which there is perfect 
symmetry in the distribution of player positions and player weights in the policy space. 
Such conditions of symmetry are rare (Schofield, 2008; Sened, 1996). In most cases we 
will have only one element in the set. More precisely, under conditions of asymmetry in 
the player positions and strengths, a unique coalition more compact than the rest will be 
found.  
 
 Proposition 3 In any finite and proper spatial voting game, under conditions of 
asymmetry in the distribution of player positions and player weights, the set of 
compromise proposals offered by compact coalitions contains a unique point which 
strictly dominates any other point outside the set (see proof in Appendix). 
 
 The results just presented allow us to predict a set of stable policy outcomes that 
will be supported by a qualified majority of decision makers in committees such as the 
EU legislature. Based on the behavioural rationale that decision makers consider both 
policy gains and policy concessions in their choice for a common policy, decision 
makers will select a policy implemented by a coalition that is more compact than the 
rest. The compact coalition constitutes a stable outcome because the combination of 
gains and concessions in this coalition turns out to be more rewarding for any pivotal 
member in the coalition, as compared to other alternatives. While symmetric conditions 
produce several compact coalitions between which players are indifferent, asymmetric 
conditions bring together like-minded legislators in a unique compact coalition. A 
single compact coalition is thus expected to form in policy-making situations in which 
decision makers compete to bring about a policy change in a determined ideological 
direction. 
  
Coalition formation in the EU legislative process 
 
The model is illustrated for the case concerning the negotiation for the adoption of the 
EU directive 2002/7/EC by co-decision, relating to maximum authorised dimensions 
and weights for road vehicles circulating within the Community. The data for this case 
is part of a larger dataset of Decision Making in the European Union (DEU), which 
collects information about legislative proposals for the Europe of 15 countries. More 
details about the structure of these data are explained in the next section, dedicated to 
the quantitative evaluation of the model. The interest now is to show the reasoning of 
the coalitional model.   
 The first information we need to apply the model refers to the institutional 
structure of the voting game, that is, the quota of votes needed to form a winning 
coalition that can implement the decision. In order to represent the EU voting game 
under co-decision (Art.169 TEU, amended by the Art 294 of the Treaty of Lisbon as 
“ordinary legislative procedure”), I adopt the DEU modelling strategy for cooperative 
games. This strategy “endogenizes” the procedural power of EU institutions by always 
including them as members of the winning coalition (see Thomson and Stokman, 2006: 
49-50). For the specific co-decision procedure, we only consider the members of the 
Council and the EP as decisive players. Although the European Commission introduces 
the legislative proposal in the co-decision procedure, its exclusion as a decisive actor is 
justified because the capacity of the Commission to strategically vary its proposal is 
limited to the first stages of the procedure
4
.  
These features are operationalized more precisely with the use of the normalised 
Banzhaf Power Index, which measures the relative capacity of decision makers to turn a 
coalition from winning to losing (see Felsenthal and Machover, 1998). In the rule 
structure of the voting game for the EU-15 regime, the governments in the Council need 
to gather 62 votes out of 87 to form a winning coalition, and, under co-decision, the EP 
is always required to complete the winning coalition. This is equivalent to saying that a 
winning coalition can form when the Council has gathered 0.69 of the total voting 
 
4
 In the larger data set, I also consider proposals under the consultation procedure, where the Commission 
has the possibility to change its proposal at any stage, while the EP has only a consultative function. The 
form of the voting game remains as indicated. However, I reverse the roles of the Commission and the 
EP, so that in consultation procedure, it is the Commission which is a decisive player and has a voting 
power score of 0.31, while the EP is a dummy player. 
 
power and the EP 0.31. Translating the voting power scores into a voting rule or quota, 
the voting game for the EU co-decision procedure then takes the following form
5
:  
 
[62+25; 25, 10, 10, 10, 10, 8, 5, 5, 5, 5, 4, 4, 3, 3, 3, 2] 
 
The data concerning the factors by which decision makers can influence the 
negotiation are their voting power, ,ic , the initial declaration of preferences for the 
issues under discussion, 
ix , and the importance they attach to the issues, is . Table 1 
presents the information about these values for the proposal on the directive 2000/7/EC. 
The voting power of each decision maker, ,ic , is calculated with the normalised Banzhaf 
Power Index. The voting power is proportional to the number of votes of each decision 
maker. Thus, big member states, with 10 votes, have voting power scores of 0.08, while 
a small state like Luxemburg has a 0.014 score. As noted, the EP always holds a voting 
power score of 0.31.  
The two other values, 
ix and is , are derived from empirical information, and are 
hence specific to the issues under negotiation. During the discussions of the proposal for 
 
5
 When some member states are indifferent to issues under discussion and do not participate in the 
process of its resolution, the quota will be readjusted. The proposal illustrated here offers an example: 
Ireland, holding 3 votes, is indifferent regarding the first issue, so that the Council has 84 active votes. 
Then, a winning coalition will need 60 votes of the Council and 24 of the supranational institution.   
  
the directive 2000/7/EC, decision makers declared discrepancies concerning two issues: 
the maximum length authorised to vehicles and whether the type of manoeuvrability of 
vehicles should correspond to the criteria laid down by the UN Economic Commission 
for Europe (UNECE) or by the EU directive 97/27/EC. The positions of decision 
makers and the importance they attach to these two issues are presented as a continuum 
for each issue of the proposal, representing the gradation between two extremes of a 
controversy, issue-by-issue. The SQ is located at the position 0, and the position 100 
corresponds to the position of the decision maker favouring the most radical policy 
change in regard to the SQ.   
It should be noted the location of the status quo is not relevant to deduce which 
coalition will form in the cooperative voting game, as players will determinately prefer 
the policy that affords them more rewards in terms of gains and concessions, no matter 
how close or far this policy is from the status quo. However, the reference to the SQ as 
the point “0” in the policy space allows us to infer the degree of policy change 
generated by the legislative process (see Achen, 2006b; Konig and Junge, 2009). 
With this information we can distinguish three groups of decision makers which 
are to be involved in the process of coalition formation. The first group of member 
governments is formed by Germany, Greece, France, Italy, Austria and Portugal.  
 
 (Table 1 about here) 
 This group prefers to set a maximum of 12 meters for two-axle buses, and to apply the 
criteria of manoeuvrability set by the UNECE. Its position is at (100, 0). A second 
group, formed by Belgium, Spain, Luxemburg, Finland and Sweden also prefers the 
criteria of manoeuvrability set by the UNECE. However, on the first issue they hold a 
position for permitting a maximum length of buses of 13.5 meters, at point (50, 0). The 
third group consists of the EP, Denmark and the UK.  The EP holds a position at (50, 
100), preferring the 13.5 meters maximum of buses‟ length but also preferring to adopt 
the less stringent criteria of manoeuvrability specified in the EU directive of 1997. 
Denmark holds the same position as the EP. However, the position of the EP is 
specifically relevant for the process of coalition formation because the supranational 
institution is always needed to form a winning coalition. The UK adopts an intermediate 
position at (50, 70), preferring the 13.5 meters length maximum, but not agreeing to any 
of the proposed criteria of manoeuvrability. The position of the UK is closer to the EP 
than to the position of any other government, except Denmark. Finally, the Netherlands 
happens to be isolated in these legislative negotiations, its position situated at the SQ, at 
the point (0, 0).  
In regard to the salience values, for this proposal, the differences among decision 
maker salience scores only appear to be determinant in the case of the EP. As the EP 
does not attach much salience to the second issue of manoeuvrability, its influence in 
the legislative bargaining will be directed towards the first issue. 
The positions of decision makers are represented in the two-dimensional graph 
of Figure 1.
6
 Since the Netherlands is not likely to lure other decision makers to form a 
winning coalition, the legislative bargaining is to be restricted to the triangle-shaped 
area of the figure. Two potential winning coalitions appear as candidates to enter a 
competition for proposals that would ultimately gather support for implementing a 
policy. A first coalition would be formed by governments of the two first groups 
mentioned. In particular, the group of Germany and other big states seems well 
positioned to offer a proposal in its favour, since this group gathers alone 44 votes. They 
would need to offer a bargaining compromise first to the EP and, secondly, to a number 
of governments of the second group sufficient enough so as to obtain the 18 votes 
needed to complete a winning coalition. The second competing coalition would be led 
by the EP, which is a decisive player and holds a distant position with respect to the 
members of the other groups. In this view, the EP may attempt to form a coalition that 
includes Denmark and the UK, as these two governments are much closer to its ideal 
point. As we will see, once the coalitional bargaining unfolds, it will be apparent that 
the EP has no incentives to form this coalition. 
 
6
 For simplicity of exposition I have not represented the power and salience of decision makers in the 
graph. Note, however, that these weights are reflected in the two alternative outcomes.  
 
                                   (Figure 1 about here) 
 
The model predicts that the compact coalition will be the first. This coalition 
offers the following compromise proposal: (71.03, 24.60; Germany, Greece, France, 
Italy, Austria, Portugal, Belgium, Spain, Luxemburg, Finland, EP). No pivotal decision 
maker in the coalition has incentives to renege on this compromise. As a consequence, 
the coalition is dominant.  
Figure 1 represents the outcome of the compact coalition at point . To see why 
this point is dominant, recall that, according to the preference function of decision 
makers, the combination of policy gains they obtain for a compromise and the policy 
concessions they would need to offer to the members of the coalition is to provide a 
better deal for them than any other alternative. In this instance, we may naively presume 
that the representatives of the EP would be tempted to look for another more favourable 
deal. The EP, in reality, could offer a compromise proposal at (65.43, 33. 66; EP, 
Denmark, UK, Germany France, Italy, Belgium, Spain, Luxemburg, Sweden). This is 
point '  in the figure, which is closer to the position of the EP. However, the pivotal 
members who would be needed in both coalitions would endure more utility losses in 
this second coalition by integrating Denmark and the UK. Indeed, Denmark and the UK 
are more isolated than any other government in the legislative bargaining, and drive the 
outcome farther away from the majority of governments. As a consequence, their 
inclusion in a coalition makes this coalition less compact, in comparison to the 
dominant coalition. For the EP this means that the majority of governments in the non-
compact coalition will claim more policy concessions, and the EP will need to pay a 
substantial portion of them. In the comparison among alternative proposals, the 
combination of total gains and concessions of the compact coalition offers a maximising 
choice to the EP.  
 The exact measures are shown in Table 2. The EP‟s utility from the compact 
coalition is 3.86, while the alternative coalition gives a utility of 5.57 units of combined 
distance of gains and concessions
7
.  
 
        (Table 2 about here) 
 
 
Leaving the compact coalition will entail a utility loss for the EP, as it would require 
more expensive adjustments between policy gains and concessions. Therefore, the 
supranational institution has no incentives to change its choice for the compact 
coalition. Because this is also the case for all the pivotal decision makers in the compact 
coalition, this coalition will be dominant.  
 
 
7
 Recall that the utility function is a decreasing function on the outcome. Smaller numbers mean smaller 
distances of policy gains and concessions combined, and hence, greater utility.   
 
Empirical accuracy of the compact coalition model: the relevance of implicit voting 
for EU policy change 
 
This section quantitatively evaluates the performance of the compact coalition model 
for 44 EU legislative proposals, containing 111 issues, which were decided under QMV. 
The objective of this evaluation is to assess whether implicit voting, and its coalitional 
dynamics, is a relevant mechanism by which decision makers reach consensual 
decisions in the EU.  
 The research design employed here consists of comparing the performance of 
the compact coalition model to that of the compromise bargaining model, which posits 
that preferences of all decision makers are integrated into the decision, so that consensus 
implies unanimous consent (Achen, 2006b; Thomson, 2011; Van den Bos, 1991). 
Attempts to falsify the impact of implicit voting from a simple comparison of the two 
models, however, involve certain difficulties. Part of the problem is that coalition 
formation and generalised bargaining may produce observational equivalence. It may be 
that the outcome selected by a qualified majority looks exactly the same as the outcome 
selected by the totality of actors in the whole assembly. To overcome this problem, I 
differentiate categories of outcomes that are expected to result from coalition formation. 
As conceived in the compact coalition model, coalition formation reflects a tendency of 
decision makers to seek reinforcement of like-minded partners in order to bring the 
outcome towards the ideological direction they prefer. In contrast, when decisions are 
taken by unanimous consent, we should expect that ideological factors play a minor role 
and that decision makers are willing to take into account the preferences of all 
legislators. In this view, I will tease out the influence of implicit voting on consensus 
building by addressing the extent to which coalitional predictions tend to correspond to 
observed outcomes reflecting a choice from one side of the ideological spectrum.  
In the operationalization of the comparison between coalitional and unanimous 
mechanisms of consensus, the compromise model has been chosen among other 
possible bargaining models because it uses the same “parameters” as the compact 
coalition model.  It also weights the positions of the players, where the weights are their 
voting power and salience, but it does so for all the players of the committee. Since the 
compromise model appeals to the same inputs as the compact coalition model, it allows 
us to obtain a direct comparison between implicit voting and unanimous consent.
8
 In 
addition, the compromise model performs better than most of the alternative bargaining 
 
8
 One difference between the two models, however, is the coding of indifferent actors. Proponents of the 
compromise model give indifferent actors a position halfway between the proposal of the Commission 
and the reference point. I have maintained their original coding in running their model here. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
models (see Achen, 2006b), providing us with a strong test for the compact coalition 
model to satisfy. 
Information on the legislative decisions has been obtained from the data set of 
the Decision-making in the European Union (DEU) research project (Thomson et al., 
2006). Through expert interviews, the DEU program collects data on positions, salience 
and outcomes for 66 legislative proposals and 162 issues, decided by the co-decision 
and consultation procedures and introduced by the Commission between 1999 and 
2000. Here only the 44 proposals decided under QMV are examined, as these are the 
only proposals where implicit voting is relevant. All proposals selected dealt with issues 
that presented controversy among the decision makers and which aroused public 
attention, so that very technical and routine proposals were excluded from the sample. 
Information about the actor positions and saliencies was collected after the proposals 
were issued by the Commission and before the adoption of the legislative act. Yet, the 
actual outcomes are also included in the dataset. As we saw in the case illustrating the 
model, this information is presented in issue continua where the SQ is located at the 
position 0, and the position 100 corresponds to the most distant position in regard to the 
SQ. In this manner, estimation about the degree of policy change is possible. The more 
distant outcomes are from the SQ, the more policy change the legislative process 
generates. 
The evaluation of the models uses the standard testing procedure for 
deterministic models consisting of comparing the distance existing between the 
predicted outcomes and the observed outcomes (see Bueno de Mesquita and Stokman, 
1994; Thomson, 2011; Thomson et al., 2006; Schneider et al., 2010). More precisely, 
the testing measure employed is the Mean Absolute Error (MAE), that is, the average 
size of the forecasting error. The accuracy of predictions is then estimated by the degree 
of the forecasting error they produce. As it is well known, deterministic models are not 
amenable to probabilistic statistical evaluation because they predict equilibrium points 
which are assumed to occur with certainty (see Achen, 2006b; Junge, 2010; Morton, 
1999; Signorino, 1999). Alternative tests to estimate the quality of the model, such as 
normalised predictions (Bueno de Mesquita and Stokman, 1994) or hit rates (Achen, 
2006b; Schneider et al. 2010), could have been used. However, given the structure of 
the data generation process of deterministic models, the discrepancies between observed 
and predicted outcomes provide a sensible measure of forecasting accuracy (Morton, 
1999; Achen, 2006b) and serve well the purpose of comparing implicit voting and 
unanimous consent.  
The first test I conduct evaluates the performance of the compact coalition 
model and the compromise model for all issues and by legislative procedure. We want 
here to obtain a general assessment of the success of the models. For this purpose, the 
median voter has been used as a null model. The median provides atheoretical 
predictions, and therefore, serves as a baseline to evaluate the quality of the two 
theoretical models. Table 3 reports the predictions of the models. Both models perform 
better than the median. The compromise model fares slightly better for all issues under 
QMV, with a MAE of 25.56 against the 26.19 of the compact coalition model. The 
differences, however, are not very big and for the most relevant procedure of the EU, 
the co-decision procedure, the compact coalition model performs better, with a MAE of 
26.84 against the 27.28 of the compromise model. Overall, coalition formation and 
generalised bargaining tend to offer very similar results in this comprehensive test. We 
can confirm that consensus is generally preferred by EU decision makers but not 
whether a majority of decision makers will be enough to make a consensual decision. 
 
(Table 3 about here) 
 
Despite this similarity of predictions, the association between the forecasts of the 
two models in a linear transformation turns out to be lower than we may have 
presumed, with a Pearson correlation of 0.58. This indicates that the different causal 
mechanisms the two models posit have also a reflection on the data.  
The second test performed seeks to evaluate more directly the impact of implicit 
voting by focusing on its causal mechanism. For this purpose, I differentiate outcomes 
reflecting ideological choices that are expected to result from coalition formation. Given 
the structure of our data, ideological choices are represented as outcomes pointing to 
more or less pronounced policy change. I thus perform a MAE test for different levels 
of policy change, ranging from minimum to pronounced policy change. I expect that, if 
ideological factors are influential, decision makers will tend to build majoritarian 
coalitions, which in turn will be reflected on outcomes that fall at a determined level of 
policy change. By contrast, I expect that if ideological factors have a minor effect, 
decision makers will prefer to form the grand coalition, and this will be reflected by a 
lesser impact of coalition formation on the level of policy change. Naturally, our 
evaluation of implicit voting in this design needs to be posited in relative terms. If the 
compact coalition model performs better for a determined level of policy change 
relative to the compromise bargaining model, then policy change will be driven more 
by implicit voting and less by unanimous consent. If, on the contrary, this is not the 
case, we should conclude that implicit voting has no influence on consensus building 
and that decision makers are inclined to adopt all-inclusive compromises by unanimity.   
Table 4 shows the MAE for three levels of policy change. Observed outcomes 
are coded as promoting low, moderate or pronounced policy change according to their 
location in an issue continuum bounded between 0 and 100. We can see that the 
prediction of the compact coalition model is more uniformly distributed than the 
prediction of the compromise model, as estimated by the error the models yield for the 
three levels of policy change. 
       (Table 4 about here) 
  
 This result suggests that implicit voting does have an influence on the way 
consensus is taken, and, ultimately, on the ideological direction of this consensus. The 
fact that both minimal policy change and pronounced policy change are better predicted 
by the compact coalition model informs us that decision makers attempt to align 
themselves with other like-minded partners in order to influence the policy outcome 
they prefer, and that they are willing to make policy concessions to those partners so as 
to increase the chances that a policy close to this outcome will be selected by a majority.  
Yet the compromise model fares remarkably better when decisions are moderate. 
Given our testing measure, the fact that the mean-oriented compromise model is 
favoured in situations of medium levels of policy change is not surprising (see Bueno de 
Mesquita, 2004). However, the differences in prediction are wide enough to prompt 
some informed conclusions. The “grand coalition” appears thus a superior mechanism 
when conditions for consensus reflect the existence of a centric voter. In this case, 
excluding any decision maker from the compromise appears to be either unsuitable or 
unnecessary. Decision makers prefer to disregard minor ideological divergences and 
take everyone on board in the final decision. The compact coalition model also predicts 
well in moderate decisions, but not as well as the compromise model. In this view, the 
final interpretation derived from the evidence is that when controversy is less acute, 
decision makers have a tendency to act unanimously. However, when issues are more 
ideologically polarised, implicit voting appears to be a more determinant mechanism in 
the configuration of consensual decisions. 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
Theoretical explanations and empirical assessments of how consensual agreements in 
the EU are reached have commonly focused on unanimous consent. However, the 
question of whether consensus may be reached under the “Damocles sword” of a 
qualified majority has received little rigorous theoretical treatment. The article 
addresses this shortcoming with a model of coalition formation positing that decision 
makers select a majoritarian compromise by pondering the policy gains they are to 
obtain from a compromise and the policy concessions they need to give in order to see 
this outcome supported by a qualified majority. The result of the legislative bargaining 
in which decision makers evaluate different choice alternatives is the formation of a 
compact coalition which is to implement the final policy.  
At the theoretical level, the compact coalition model yields the finding of a 
stable solution for finite and proper spatial voting games which usually have an empty 
core. The proposed solution thus relates to other classic core solutions of well-
established cooperative theories, and suggests a refinement to these solutions. While the 
article does not mean to suggest that the decision maker motivations for exchanging 
policy gains and concessions in order to reach an agreement with a like-minded 
majority exist for every political situation, it is natural enough to assume that they do 
exist in cooperative decision making environments where the penalisation for not 
reaching an agreement is high. The EU legislative process is commonly perceived as 
such a cooperative environment. At the empirical level, the quantitative evaluation of 
the model yields mixed results. The evidence suggests that in the EU legislative process 
ideological majorities vote implicitly in order to drive consensus towards minimum or 
pronounced levels of policy change. However, when majorities have moderate policy 
choices, they are inclined to take everybody on board and unanimous consent remains a 
powerful mechanism.   
 
Appendix  
 
 
Proposition 1. Proof.  We begin by recalling the structure of the social choice game. 
Let ( , , )G N v U  be a finite spatial voting game and let C N  be any coalition in G. 
Let 
1{ ,..., }nA be subset of feasible outcomes in G, so that ( )v C A if C is winning 
and ( ) 0v C  if C is losing. Recall that U is the utility function specifying the 
preference profiles of players on A. From U, define the distance between the realisation 
of player i’ preference,
ix , and a given outcome, A , as follows:  
 
i jj N
j N
x x
d               (4) 
 
where jx  denotes the preference of any player j in the a assembly, so that j i .  
Applying this definition to any two policy proposals in G implemented by 
potential winning coalitions, ( ; ) and ( '; ')C C , assume the following inequality among 
coalitional outcomes : 
 
'd d                                                                                             (5) 
 
Substituting, we obtain:  
 
'
'
' 'i j i jj C j C
j C j C
x x x x
                                        (6) 
 From the inequalities (5) and (6), it follows that the difference among the distances 
between each member in coalition C  and the outcome of their coalition, , is less 
pronounced than the difference among the distances between the members of coalition 
'C  and the outcome of their coalition, ' . We say that C  is more compact than 'C . 
Since 
'd d  implies ( ) iu ( ')u , it follows that C  is undominated by 'C .□ 
 
Proposition 2. Proof.  Let G=(N, v, U) be finite and proper and let com A  be the set 
of ordered pairs offered by compact coalitions:  
  
'( ; ) for no ( '; ')  it is the case that ( ) ( ) for all ( ){ }com iC A C A u u i v C  (2)                                                                                  
                                           
Then, 
com
 iff  the expression (2) holds true for any finite and proper simple game, 
that is, iff the points in the set com are undominated in G. In order to prove that this is 
the case, we need to show that a weak preference profile U on com  is reflexive, 
complete and acyclic, for all ( )i v C : 
 
Reflexivity: For all ( ; )C com , since  is reflexive, then ( ) ( )iU u u .  
 
Completeness: For all ( ; )C and ( '; ') comC , since G is proper,
'C C . Let 
'i C C . Since U is complete, then either ( ) ( ') or ( ) ( ')i iu u u u .  
 
Acyclicity: Let ( ''; '')C , ( '; ')C , ( ; )C com . Then, for all '' 'i C C , ( '') iu ( ')u , 
and for all i 'C C , ( ') iu ( )u . By completeness we know that if ( '') iu ( ')u , 
then ( '') ( ')i u , and hence, ( '') iu ( )u . Since G is proper, for all 
i ''C C .  Therefore, ( '') iu ( ') iu ( )u , and hence, '' 'd d d . Otherwise 
(since U is complete) there exist ( '''; ''')C com \{ ( ''; '')C , ( '; ')C , ( ; )C } such that, 
for all ''' ''i C C , ( ''') ( '')iu u . By acyclicity it must be that ( ''') ( ')iu u and 
( ''') iu ( )u  as well. Since G is proper, for all i ''' 'C C  and for all 
i '''C C  as well. Therefore, ( ''') ( '')iu u ( ')i u i ( )u , and hence, 
''' '' 'd d d d . Because the number of outcomes in A is finite (and hence the 
number of outcomes in com  is also finite) we can continue this logic to conclude that 
there must exist an alternative weakly preferred to all other alternatives in com . □ 
 
Proposition 3. Proof. The proof of the Proposition 3 on uniqueness of the compact 
coalition set is the same as the proof of Proposition 2 for a strict preference profile U on 
com , for all ( )i v C . □ 
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Table 1 Positions, saliencies and voting power in the proposal for the directive 2000/7/ECa 
 
Decisionmarkers 
 
                               
ix  
 
                               
is                   ,ic  
 
             issue 1               issue 2 
 
              issue 1              issue 2   
Commission 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland  
Italy 
Luxemburg 
Netherlands 
Austria 
Portugal 
Finland 
Sweden 
UK 
EP 
100 
50 
50 
100 
100 
50 
100 
  
100 
50 
0 
100 
100 
50 
50 
50 
50 
100 
0 
100 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
70 
100 
80 
40 
70 
90 
60 
90 
70 
50 
70 
40 
90 
70 
70 
90 
90 
50 
80 
40 
50 
70 
90 
80 
90 
80 
50 
80 
40 
80 
70 
70 
80 
80 
70 
40 
0 
0.037 
0.024 
0.08 
0.037 
0.066 
0.08 
0.024 
0.08 
0.014 
0.037 
0.031 
0.037 
0.024 
0.031 
0.08 
0.31 
 
 
 
a
 Issue 1. Maximum length authorised to vehicles =15m (2 axles), 50=13.5m (2 axles), 100=12m (2 axles) 
  Issue 2. Type of manoeuvrability of vehicles: 0= UNECE criteria of manoeuvrability UNECE, 70=no 
agreement with any proposed criteria, 100= Directive 97/27/EC criteria of manoeuvrability. 
Table 2 Competing coalitions for the adoption of directive 2000/7/ECab    
 
 
 
 
 
 
Coalitions 
 
  
  
Compact 
Coalition 
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Non-compact 
Coalition 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Coalition  
Compromise 
 
Members 
  
     Member's utility from each  
             coalition partner 
       (gains and concessions) 
 
Sum of  
member’s 
utility 
from  
each  
coalition 
partner 
 
 
 
Member’s 
utility  
from 
Coalition 
 
  
 
 
 
(71.03, 24.6) 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
GER  
GR 
FR 
ITA 
AUS 
POR 
BEL 
ESP 
LUX 
FIN 
EP 
     
     GER, GR 
      FR, ITA 
   AUS, POR 
  
     BEL, ESP 
     LUX, FIN 
  
  
             EP 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
186.55 
186.55 
186.55 
186.55 
186.55 
186.55 
181.02 
181.02 
181.02 
181.02 
226.93 
      4.34 
      4.34 
      4.34 
      4.34 
      4.34 
      4.34 
      2.62 
      2.62 
      2.62  
      2.62 
        3.86 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
70.37 
70.37 
70.37 
70.37 
116.28 
70.37 
70.37 
70.37 
70.37 
70.37 
70.37 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
110.65 
116.28 
116.28 
116.28 
116.28 
116.28 
116.28 
110.65 
110.65 
110.65 
110.65 
0.00 
 
 
 
 
(65.43, 33.66) 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
GER 
FR 
ITA 
BEL 
ESP 
LUX 
SWE 
DK 
EP 
UK 
      
     GER, FR 
              ITA 
     BEL, ESP 
   LUX, SWE 
            DK 
            EP 
  
     UK 
 
 
 
  
  
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
85.29 
85.29 
85.29 
85.29 
116.36 
116.36 
87.73 
85.29 
85.29 
85.29 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
105.13 
105.13 
76.50 
116.36 
116.36 
116.36 
105.13 
105.13 
105.13 
105.13 
0.00 
0.00 
107.58 
87.73 
87.73 
87.73 
76.50 
76.50 
76.50 
76.50 
107.58 
107.58 
0.00 
289.38 
289.38 
289.38 
266.92 
266.92 
266.92 
266.92 
329.08 
329.08 
271.81 
       5.07 
         5.07 
       5.07 
       3.92 
       3.92 
       3.92 
       3.92 
       5.57 
       5.57 
       3.53 
 
a
 The member‟s utility from the coalition is the sum of utilities from joining each of the coalition partners 
divided by the total votes of the partners in the coalition. 
b
 See Figure 1 for abbreviations. 
 
  
Table 3 Mean Absolute Error of models for all decisions under Co-decision and Consultation 
Procedures of EU legislative process 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 Mean Absolute Error of Compact Coalition Model and Compromise Model for 
different levels of policy change of EU legislative output 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                      COD                            CNS                                All issues 
                                                                                      QMV                          QMV                             QMV 
Model                                                                         (n=56)                         (n=55)                           (n=111) 
 Median voter model                                                 30. 64                        30.62                              30.63 
 Compromise model                                                   27.28                         23.84                              25.56 
 Compact coalition model                                         26.84                         25.54                              26.19 
                                                   Minimal                           Moderate                             Pronounced  
                                                  policy change                  policy change                      policy change 
                                                 Outcome range: 0-30     Outcome range: 30-60      Outcome range : 60-30 
Model                                                       (n=27)                          (n=36)                          (n=48) 
compromise model                                 42.92                            13.84                            25.1 
Compact coalition model                       36.3                              23.73                            22.3 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Spatial model of coalitional bargaining in the negotiations of the directive 2000/7/EC. 
The horizontal dimension represents the first issue of the negotiations, dealing with the 
maximum length authorised to vehicles. The vertical dimension concerns the second issue on 
the criteria to determine the type of manoeuvrability of vehicles (AUS: Austria, BEL: Belgium, 
DK: Denmark, EP: European Parliament, ESP: Spain, FIN: Finland, FR: France, GER: 
Germany, GR: Greece, IRE: Ireland, ITA: Italy, LUX: Luxemburg, NL: Netherlands, POR: 
Portugal, SWE: Sweden, UK: United Kingdom) 
 
 
 
      
